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Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals
By DUNCAN JAMES AND R. MARK ISAAC* Tournament incentives have been extensively analyzed by economists, experts in organizational behavior, and the business press. The analysis of tournament incentives has most often looked at the effect of tournament contracts for individuals on individual behavior. This paper examines the effect of tournament incentives on overall market performance.
In an asset market setting, a number of questions about market performance assert themselves. The most important of these questions is: does the use of such tournament contracts for traders affect bubble formation? This question is especially topical: mutual funds are increasingly dominant in capital markets, and mutual fund managers are generally held to be compensated in proportion to the degree to which they "beat the market."
In particular, we seek to determine if tournament contracts are helpful, harmful, or irrelevant to asset double auction performance. To this end, we present a theoretical discussion of the existence and nature of equilibrium in asset markets with tournament incentives in place for the decision makers. We present the results of laboratory experiments designed to illuminate the kind of behavior we might expect from actual people facing tournament incentives in an actual institution (an asset double auction).
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a discussion of the tournament incentives literature. Section II presents an a priori theoretical discussion of the effect on asset market equilibrium of introducing tournament incentives for individuals. Section III details the hypotheses at which we aim our experiments. Section IV details our experimental design. Section V reports our empirical results. Section VI concludes.
I. Literature Review
The literature on tournaments has included research focusing on such topics as employment contracts (Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982), sports events (Ronald G. Ehrenburg and Michael L. Bognanno, 1990), and work teams inside the firm (Clive Bull et al., 1987) . There are two regularities across this literature. First, the focus of analysis is typically the role of tournament contracts inside the firm. The market in which the firm using the tournament contract operates is seldom considered. Second, the tournament contract is usually described as increasing the wealth of the firm's owners, and as being an appropriate response to an environment characterized by moral hazard (an environment in which employees shirk).
These regularities are, of course, not perfectly descriptive of the literature. First, there is an acknowledgment that tournament contracts may have effects on aspects of behavior other than effort. Examples here include Nalebuff and Stiglitz, and Ehrenberg and Bognanno, both of which see tournaments as potentially altering an individual's adoption of risky strategies. Second, there is a relatively small subliterature which looks at the effects of tournament contracts for individuals on individual behavior in market settings. An example is the work of Keith C. Brown et al. (1996) . The authors argue that paying money managers to "beat the market"' sets up a tournament within the mutual fund industry. From this point they argue that managers who trail the market midway through 996   THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  SEPTEMBER 2000 the evaluation period will reallocate their holdings to relatively risky assets.2 These latter papers suggest that tournament incentives can lead to risky, or even destructive, individual behavior. How such individual behavior might impact market processes and outcomes is an intriguing question as yet unexplored. In the theory section of our paper, we provide a specific example of effects of tournament contracts on individual agent behavior, and further show the implications of these effects for asset market performance.
Finally, we point out that tournament contracts are of more than academic interest. Examples of tournament contracts in the business world abound-for instance, the following anecdote refers to a series of events at Fidelity Investments.
Dismayed by the change of direction and all of the risk-averse dicta-and lured by higher salaries at companies whose funds were performing better-the stars began their exodus. "It was a lose/lose situation," explains one of the departing crew. "Everything, your compensation, all your incentives, were tied to your performance against other funds in your class. Obviously, in order to depart from the mean, to do better than the average you had to do something different. You had to take risks." (Andrew Cohen, 1997) People do notice and react to the kind of incentives we investigate in a controlled environment.
II. Theory
Jean Tirole (1982) We thus observe that price can increase as expected dividends decrease.3
The preceding example uses tractable situations and assumes agents who share common expectations and knowledge of all aspects of the economy except future realized dividends. In field situations, the computational complexity of trading situations would be greater, and the information on competitors' positions imperfect, while the agents themselves would not have infinite memories or infinitely quick computational abilities.4 What then might transpire in an actual asset market with actual people facing tournament incentives? The (rational) pricing away from intrinsic value whose possibility was just shown is one possibility. But given computational complexity and agents' imperfect knowledge of the asset market, common expectations may not exist, and may not develop. Hence price bubbles due to the lack of common expectations may occur in addition to or instead of the type of non-intrinsic-value pricing shown in this example.5
Our theory of price formation in the presence of tournament incentives has the following two implications for laboratory markets. First, we can expect to see markets that do not converge to the expected value of remaining dividends. Second, there is no reason to believe that lack of convergence will mitigate with more trader experience with tournament contracts. In fact, just the opposite is possible: as traders gain more experience with tournament contracts, they become more sophisticated at working out the strategic possibilities for "beating the market," resulting in trading further from intrinsic value with more experience.
Some might object that stocks in field situations do not have known terminal dates, and hence the fact that tournament incentives rule out the intrinsic value backward induction equilibrium is irrelevant for field asset pricing. Even if such is the case (and it may not be, as there are evaluation periods that punctuate time for fund managers), then it is still possible that tournament incentives induce pricing away from intrinsic value by alternative means. In 3 Similar examples can be constructed with different patterns of deviation of trading from intrinsic value. For example, one can show that mutually beneficial trades can occur below intlinsic value. 4 This last point takes on particular significance when one notes that trading would take place in real time.
S Suppose, for instance, that one trader observes the price increasing in a way that is not justified by expected dividends. If she does not know exactly how her competitors are faring in the tournament, does she take this as evidence of a rational commitment to betting on particular dividend draws-a course of action that is forced on traders by the tournament contract? Or as evidence of another trader's trying to bluff her into participating in a more conventionally defined bubble? Beyond that, what do other traders think she thinks? What does she think they think she thinks? Clearly, this is a situation where there need not be common expectations, and hence one where bubbles in the sense of Tirole may exist. Three results from SSW are particularly important for our design. First, specifying different private dividend values was not a necessary condition for trading in a laboratory asset market. Second, the modal classification of market outcomes at low levels of subject experience was one of price bubbles. Third, markets tended to converge toward intrinsic value pricing and lower volume as groups of subjects became more experienced. The critical design change appears to be the lack of asset reinitialization and the resulting 15-period asset life. SSW conclude that "real people in any environment usually do not come off the stops with common expectations.... With experience, and its lessons in trial-and-error learning, expectations tend strongly to converge and yield [a rational expectations] equilibrium." This learning included both within-experiment learning (bubbles tend to crash near the known end point) and across-experiment learning (there was some 6 This hypothesis is motivated as follows. In a theoretical Tirole asset market with common expectations, no trade occurs. With repetition, experimental asset markets have been shown to converge toward the Tirole prediction (e.g., SSW). Thus "in the limit," i.e., with exhaustive repetition, we would expect no trade in experimental asset markets. However, the theory section of our paper demonstrates that with tournament incentives in place, gains from trade can be present, even when there are common expectations. Hence, we would expect volume under tournament incentives to be greater than or equal to volume under linear incentives, given exhaustive repetition. The conjectured effect, however, may not be observed at less than exhaustive levels of repetition. 7 We are conducting a similar set of experiments with markets in which the assets have a life of only two periods, and are then reinitialized. We have found preliminary results in these markets that are at least qualitatively similar to those reported in this research.
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tendency for groups brought back multiple times to avoid price bubbles). These results from SSW and related work provide the groundwork for a critical test of our hypotheses regarding tournament contracts. The SSW results suggest that price bubbles in asset markets are the result of a (natural) lack of common expectations. After sharing multiple experiences in the same laboratory environment, many groups develop shared expectations supporting rational expectations equilibria. But our hypotheses suggest that tournament contracts can cause distorted market performance, even after the convergence toward common expectations pointed out in SSW.
It would not be surprising to observe price bubbles in early trials of an SSW-style asset market, because bubbles in such an environment are common, even in the absence of tournament contracts. In recognition of this, we implement a deliberately sequenced experimental design BBTTBT, where B represents baseline experimental payment contracts and T represents tournament contracts (the treatment condition). The first switchover between the two compensation contracts comes at the point that groups of traders using baseline contracts ($1 experimental = $1 U.S., as in SSW) have historically demonstrated clear convergence to intrinsic value pricing (between the second and third market sessions). The second switchover is intended to control for the passage of time; it gives us a baseline measurement late in the experiment. The third switchover is likewise intended to give us a treatment measurement late in the experiment.
The purpose of this sequencing is to see whether the introduction of tournament contracts will distort an asset market, while controlling for the evolution of expectations and the passage of time. With our experimental design, it should be possible to determine whether tournament contracts can distort an asset market, even after common expectations have been developed and intrinsic value pricing has been achieved.
The specific values of the experimental design are set out in Table 1 .
V. Results
The results for these experiments are unambiguously supportive of the theoretical predic- tion that tournament contracts lead to divergence from pricing at intrinsic value. The most important stylized fact that emerges from the previous 15 years of research in experimental asset markets is that repeated, shared trading experience under the baseline contract promotes convergence toward intrinsic value pricing. We are able to replicate this finding. However, we also find that the imposition of tournament contracts reverses this process! Repeated, shared trading experience when tournament incentives are in place promotes divergence from intrinsic value pricing.
The data are visually reported in the following form. The price data are the mean trading prices per period, measured as deviation from intrinsic value. These are displayed in Figure  1 The first two market sessions (baseline incentives) show a classic convergence from a bubble toward intrinsic value, as has been observed by other researchers.8 The third session is difficult to interpret. It is closer to intrinsic value than session 1, but there also appear to be multiperiod moves away from intrinsic value. As such, were session 3 to be judged on a stand-alone basis, it would be hard to draw clear conclusions. Fortunately, such is not the case; there are further sessions of data that can make the case conclusively. The fourth session (tournament incentives) diverges further from intrinsic value than session 3; this is odd in that convergence has been found by other researchers to be roughly monotonic in subject experience. At this point one might claim that these are simply subjects who do not understand what they are doing; that they might never converge, regardless of the type of incentive treatment used. Hence session 5 again employs baseline incentives; the subjects locked on to trading at (or very close to) the intrinsic value price throughout the experiment. At this point one might claim that the subjects converged to intrinsic 'The second session was much closer to converging to intrinsic value than can be apparent from the price graphs. Trader 4 was the buyer in 20 of the 30 trades above intrinsic value. He had been the top earner in the first session, which bubbled severely. He was clearly trying to start a bubble in this session also, and drove his earnings down to $1.40 (compared with average earnings of $13.04) in the attempt. We reasoned that it was appropriate to go forward with the switch of treatments because all the other traders had demonstrated a willingness to sell into the buying pressure that Trader 4 was trying to generate, and further that Trader 4 would be disciplined by this experience, and would develop similar expectations to the rest of the group before the start of the third session. We believe that Trader 4's behavior in the third session is consistent with our conjecture; in an environment theoretically conducive to pricing away from intrinsic value, he did not attempt to start a bubble single-handedly, as before. Rather, he "scalped" on the bid/offer fluctuations generated by the other, previously converged traders. Volume Per Period FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF VOLUME BY TREATMENT value in session 5 because they were fourfold more experienced, but failed to converge in session 4, not because they were faced with tournament incentives, but because they were only threefold more experienced. Hence session 6 again employs tournament incentives; trading diverges wildly from intrinsic value. Note that this occurs after the subjects had demonstrated the ability to trade at intrinsic value for an entire experiment, given baseline incentives.9'10 We now turn to a time-series statistical analysis of this data. Time (as a proxy for the convergence toward common expectations) has been suggested by prior researchers to be the foremost explanator of price deviations from equilibrium. Hence our econometric analysis compares the explanatory power of a regression employing a time trend, intercept treatment dummies, and slope treatment dummies as regressors to the explanatory power of a regression employing only a time trend as a regressor.
The dependent variable in the regressions The statistical results for the unrestricted regression (employing dummies for experiments using tournament incentives) are given in Table  2 . The line-fit for this regression is quite striking, and is reproduced in Figure 4 .12 The line-fit in Figure 4 illustrates that the effects of tournament incentives are directly counter to the previously documented effects of repeated, shared trading experience.
9 Trader 8 did not show up at the preset time for session 6. A protocol describing how this situation was handled is available from the authors on request.
10 Four of the last six trades in the last period of session 6 suggest extreme subject frustration with the tournament contract. In particular, two traders who were not going to make money under the tournament contract entered what appear to be frustration bids of (sequentially) $5.00, $5.00, $9.99, and $1.22. These bids were of course snapped up by other traders, who were thus pushed above the market average, and so made money under the tournament contract.
There are two explanations for these four trades: frustration or collusion. Under the tournament contract, the maximum extraction of cash from the experimenter occurs if all nine traders conspire to concentrate all the working capital and shares in the experiment in the hands of a single trader (and then divide that money among themselves later). Hence there is a collusive optimum for the subjects that is not of interest to the experimenter. This collusive outcome would be likely if all nine subjects knew each other well and could coordinate their actions in the time between market sessions. For example, with subjects drawn from, say, the same floor of a dormitory, this would be a problem. Otherwise, the collusive outcome is extremely unlikely. Why? Because for a "sweetheart" bid or offer to make it from one conspirator to another, it has to pass by seven other traders in our design. Thus, ex ante, collusion appears difficult, and potential conspirators (of number less than nine) would realize this (ex ante). Ex post, analysis of trades suggests not only that collusion was never a problem, but also that frustration bids/offers were limited to the last 90 seconds of the two-week series of market sessions. For example, using maximum holding value of a share as a way to diagnose frustration (or collusion) trades, we find that prior to the last 90 seconds of the last period of the last experiment only two trades occurred above maximum holding value. Those were both during the bubble (by the then inexperienced subjects) in the first session, which employed baseline incentives (with which collusion is not an issue).
Given that these four trades in session 6 incorporate frustration bids, we drop them from the analysis. Given that these trades occurred far above intrinsic value, this adjustment biases the results against our theoretical prediction about pricing away from intrinsic value. 
